STRATEGY BRIEFS |
Tips from a Handbook on Controlling Corruption
Fighting Corruption is often a lonely and difficult task. The Parliamentarian's Handbook offers insights on the techniques and approaches that can lighten the burden .
Anti-corruption efforts by individual members of parliament are often lonely, exasperating and even dangerous undertakings. This is the experience not only in Africa but across the world. Corruption, as the saying goes, often fights back.
The necessity of fighting corruption is nonetheless clear and, across the world, members of parliament are increasingly taking to the anti-corruption frontline. As a result – and in part as a deliberate strategy of better fighting corruption – parliamentarians are forming coalitions across national borders and continents to fight corruption. The African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption (APNAC) and the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) are two such coalitions.
A body of knowledge is also now accumulating on the tactics and strategies of fighting corruption. One such body of knowledge is the Parliamentarians Handbook on Controlling Corruption , whose third edition was published in august last year. The handbook is the product of a series of seminars spanning over two years - in the Caribbean, Africa and Asia - and bringing together parliamentarians and specialists from across the globe.
For individual members of parliament committed to the fight against corruption and groups such as individual Apnac Chapters across Africa , this is a useful source of information.
The Parliamentarians Handbook on Controlling Corruption The handbook is a concise, 80 page booklet with just five chapters, each of which closes with a one page Key Points highlight. It encompasses everything from the definition, forms and cause of corruption to the tools and tasks of fighting corruption and coalition building. Also included are the experiences of GOPAC and the World Bank's Parliamentarians Network as well as the organizational and coalition making experiences and challenges from Malawi and Kenya .
Interestingly, the handbook is itself the result of an anti-corruption coalition. It is the culmination of a project that was began in 1998 - the ‘Laurentian seminar' project – by the World Bank Institute and the Parliamentary Centre, Canada; backed by the Canadian International Development Agency. It is this same project that helped initiate APNAC in 1998 and GOPAC in 2002. Better still; the handbook is based on the results of a series of workshops and conferences in which parliamentarians from Africa and beyond shared expertise, views, opinions and experiences on fighting corruption.
Key Points in the Handbook For individual African members of parliament and APNAC chapters, the first key point in the Handbook is, curiously, the view it takes on corruption. While it acknowledges the basic truism of corruption as a crime that is committed by individuals or groups of individuals, it takes the approach of focusing on strengthening institutions of governance rather than blaming corrupt individuals. This is a critical strategic choice of focus: it, in effect, accepts that as long as the operating political environment is conducive to corruption, even well intentioned individuals and well designed policies can lead to disappointing results and greater corruption. The central thrust of an effective fight against corruption is therefore the strengthening of the legal and institutional capacity of the governance system.
The handbook goes further to suggest practical measures to strengthen governance institutions, particularly parliament. The choice of parliament is itself justified by its centrality as the institutional bridge between the state and society and its critical role in good governance. Generally, it is parliament –the peoples' own elected representatives - that citizens look up to, to hold governments accountable and engender honesty and integrity in governance.
Among the measures proposed by the handbook are the following:
• Building Political will by Setting a Good Example The handbook takes the view that it is pointless to propose reforms unless they are backed by a solid political commitment. The presence of even the most determined reformers in senior leadership positions will mean little if they lack political backing or space to act. As such, the creation of political will to fight corruption is a key consideration for anyone intent on fighting corruption. Political will is defined here as ‘demonstrated credible intent of actors to attack the perceived causes and effects of corruption at a systemic level'.
To deal with the problem, the handbook proposes that the first area of focus for anti-corruption parliamentarians is parliament itself, with the aim of making the House politically hostile to corruption and therefore strong enough to engender political will in other organs of state. Three levels of engagement are proposed. These are:
• Measures to guide the pre-election period. The process of building political will should begin well before parliamentarians enter the August House. Specifically, the handbook proposes that parliamentarians determined to fight corruption should focus on pushing for electoral laws that require: • i. Prospective candidates to make public declarations of contributions, assets and expenditure during the campaigns.
• ii. Only those who are free of corruption and criminal records qualify to run for elections.
• Measures to guide the conduct of parliament The handbook then proposes that, as a second level of forcing through conducive political will in parliament, parliamentarians should demonstrate commitment to combat corruption by ensuring their personal integrity and that of parliament. This will entail enacting legislation on: • Campaign financing reforms; • Code of conduct; • Wealth declarations and follow-up measures to ensure parliamentarians do not use their positions corruptly. • Establish pay levels for parliamentarians that are transparent; • Conflict of interest guidelines; • Performance enhancement such as recall provisions. • Immunity from prosecution for parliamentarians over their contributions in parliamentary debate and committee meetings but not over criminal acts of any nature.
• Measures to create anti-corruption coalitions The third level of engagement is for parliamentarians to act together across party lines on the anti-corruption agenda. While this is, in most African countries, a very difficult proposition, it is a necessary foil against the sectarian politicization of the agenda and its exploitation by both the government and the opposition against each other.
Parliamentarians must also build coalitions with credible civil society organizations as these groups are essential partners in convincing political leaders of the need for effective anti-corruption initiatives.
Correspondingly, parliamentarians and civil society organizations should partner with independent media to pressure the government in the right direction.
• Measures to generate public support for anti-corruption measures The handbook also proposes that parliamentarians should utilize their public stature to openly condemn corruption and attract support for the fight against corruption. A strong relationship and engagement with constituents and the wider public is vital in ensuring accountability. Related to that is the need for parliamentarians to enact laws that protect civil liberties.
• Ensuring Accountability The handbook also takes the position that parliamentarians intent on fighting corruption require to take measures that promote accountability in the management of state affairs. Accountability is here summed up as the degree to which governments have to justify or explain their actions and inactions to the citizenry. It is the ability to hold public officials and their representatives to standards of conduct that are transparent and broadly accepted in society.
In pursuing accountability, it is pointed out that parliamentarians need to contend with the increasingly complex issues that have entered the policy-making arena, not least, the variety of policies, the rapid policy changes and confusing multiplicity of policy objectives. Thus, to achieve accountability, the handbook proposes the following parliamentary tools: • i. Measures to ensure a system of checks and balance and encourage an attentive citizenry. This includes a legislative framework that defines government intentions and regulates the powers of the executive. It also includes strong and active parliamentary committee able to access, scrutinize and monitor implementation of policies, including examination of government accounts and records.
• ii. To complement the departmental committees, should be other independent watchdog institutions such as Supreme Audit Institutions and an Anti-Corruption Authority that report directly to parliament.
• iii. A handbook notes that some African countries have already set up ‘Committees of Assurance' where ministers are held accountable for statements and promises made to parliament.
• iv. Measures to facilitate access to information for parliamentarians through independent and reliable parliamentary research services, civil society organizations and the media.
The handbook is also of the view that haste into action is a danger to the anti-corruption agenda as it is to most undertakings in life. When confronted by important policy matters, the handbook, cautions parliamentarians from hastening to ‘do something' before first undertaking a proper study of the issue. A comprehensive diagnosis and good planning are necessary, particularly at the parliamentary Committee work. Suggested issues to consider in developing parliamentary planning include: • In depth analysis of the policy issue; • Identification of the actors likely to have influence; • Building of a team of allies and experts; • Definition of goals and determination of the objectives; • Assessment of the available resources; • Conversion of the plan into a manageable project on the basis of available resources; • Evaluation of results; • Preparation of interim recommendations to which government should respond. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ends/Jonah Njonge/ GOPAC Handbook
Strategy Brief -2: Understanding Corruption
Corruption is more than bribery
To fight corruption, it is vital to appreciate the variations, forms, causes and consequences of corruption. GOPAC handbook on Controlling Corruption gives an insight.
The GOPAC Handbook on Controlling Corruption offers a comprehensive yet concise reference on corruption.
Definition The handbook defines corruption as the ‘abuse of public position for private, individual or group to whom one owes allegiance'. It occurs when a public official accepts, solicits, or extorts payment, or when private agents offer a payment to circumvent the law for competitive or personal advantage.
Forms of Corruption It lists four intertwined forms of corruption. The first form is bribery and grease payments . Bribery is the payments sought by public officials – or offered by private agents – in return for favours such as government contract. Grease payment is money paid to public officials to do work that they are already being paid to do, such as issuing a license.
Second is petty and grand corruption . Petty corruption is the collision of a public official with a member of the public to subvert the system over relatively small transactions. It therefore mostly involves lower level public officials. Grand corruption is the subversion of the system by senior government officials, ministers and heads of state.
Third is bureaucratic Corruption . This the abuse of discretion by public officials to bend or circumvent rules and regulations in exchange for certain benefits. It occurs mostly where there is considerable rewards and punishment discretion under an official's control.
Last, but by no means least, is political corruption . This is the trading of influence and authority by political leaders and may extend to granting favours, irregularities in campaign financing and electoral fraud.
Causes of Corruption The causes of corruption are rooted in a country's political and legal development, its social history, bureaucratic traditions, economic conditions and policies. Generally, the weaker the institutions of governance are, the more prevalent is corruption.
Five conditions that facilitate corruption are listed. They are:
Political conditions that foster corruption include weal civil liberties , particularly the level of press freedom, the ability of individual citizens to form civil society organizations, and the level of structured political competition. They also include lack of transparency and accountability on the part of government officials especially where the ruling elite have captured the state. State capture in turn is more likely where the government has extensive involvement in the economy and regulation of public life.
Theses include the expansion of the state bureaucracy with the attendant increase in discretionary powers for the bureaucrats. Growth of the bureaucracy allows select individuals to gain direct access to state resources and to enjoy considerable privileges associated with administrative office.
The quality of a country's legal system, particularly the possibility of being caught and punished meaningfully, determines the level of corruption. This is turn linked to the existence of effective anti-corruption laws, an effective police and an independent judiciary.
Levels of economic development affect the forms and sectors where corruption is most prevalent. Petty corruption is particularly common in developing countries while in developed countries, the higher incomes mean corruption tends to be of a grand scale. Corruption is also more likely in countries where governments control monopolistic economic entities thus creating space for officials to promote their own interests and those of their allies.
Countries that give a high degree of protection to their economies may experience domestic corruption as well as from international corporations. Tariff barriers and such other protective measures raise the incentive for private interests to bribe public officials.
Despite achieving independence, many countries in transition suffer from ‘new colonialism' of corruption as they grapple with systemic corruption introduced during their colonization or occupation. In addition, developed countries have been reluctant to penalize their companies that foster corruption in developing countries. As a result corruption of third world countries by major international companies has tended to be seen as no more than just another competitive expense in the global marketplace. Major companies have thus paid bribes to win business in third world countries.
Consequences of Corruption Effects of corruption are far reaching and impact across social, economic and political spheres of a country. Generally, corruption has the followi ng consequences:
Corruption negatively affects the quality of governance in a country and creates political instability by undermining the legitimacy of the political system. While the specific consequences vary according to the type and level of corruption – and the political system in place – the political consequences of corruption include: • The dominance of personal gain over ideology and principle with the effect that government is less able to implement laws and policies.
• Diminishing reputation of politicians and politics and an upsurge of disreputable people in politics for the wrong reasons. This is coupled with weakened public trust in political institutions and process with the effect of encouraging cynicism and less popular participation in politics by the people.
• Pervasion of the electoral process, consolidation of political power by a small elite, distortion of political development as political competition is reduced and, in extreme cases, the gradual loss of political stability and the advent of violence, civil wars and coups d'etat . Corruption also leads to the capture of the state by a political party with the effect that the bureaucracy, business and media loss their effectiveness.
The economic costs of corruption also vary according to the governance system in place and the scale and for of corruption. In all instances, however, corruption acts as an unofficial tax burden on consumers and producers. This serves to retard economic development and misallocate a country's capital and talent resources. The focus of business competition shifts away from the marketplace to the levels of bribe and political connections thus denying the people the benefit of genuine business competition.
Petty corruption tends to impose additional disproportionate costs on the poor but have less impact on the wider economic fundamentals while grand corruption affects the majority poor less directly but has a huge and potentially crippling effect on the economy. In either case, it is the poor that bear the heaviest burden, reinforcing extreme gaps between the rich and the poor.
Among the more glaring specific consequences of corruption are: • A decrease of economic efficiency and the operations of the market economy.
• Distortion of public expenditure as focus shifts to activities more likely to yield corruption opportunities such as huge infrastructure and defense contracts.
• Reduced levels of direct foreign investment as the cost of production rises.
The social effects of corruption are the creation and accentuation of social divisiveness, inequality and conflict. The division between the poor and the rich becomes more pronounced and bitter and the poor begin regarding the government as predatory and oppressive rather than enabling. At the same time, corruption accentuates ethnic and other sectarian divisions as it promotes a culture of suspicion, distrust, rivalries and jealousies.
At another level, corruption diverts public expenditure from social programs with the effect that the country's education, health and social services are neglected. The impact is most severe among the marginalized groups, women and children. Strategy Brief 3: Lessons from the OECD countries A joint Approach to Dealing with Conflict of Interest
The Worlds most industrialized countries have embarked on a joint approach to minimize conflict of interest in the public sector. What lessons can Apnac members draw from the OECD countries ?
Conflict of interest is one of the key issues that Apnac members can expect to be grappling with in the foreseeable future, both as individual members of Parliament and as law makers. This is because conflict of interest arises when public officials have to make decisions at work that may affect their private interests.
In the past, conflict of interest concerns tended to focus on traditional sources of influence, such as gifts or hospitality offered to public officials and personal or family relationships. In recent years, however, increased co-operation and interaction between the public and the private sectors have made the whole issue more complex. This is, in part, a consequence of the expansion of the grey area between private and public affairs occasioned by the breaking down of barriers between public and private sectors through the privatization of services, public/private partnerships and exchanges of personnel. As a result, new opportunities for corruption have emerged. For instance, conflicts between public officials' individual private interests and their public duties have multiplied due to the contracting out of government functions such as defence.
The new configuration of conflict of interest makes it one of the key governance issue facing not only Apnac members and chapters but practically all members of parliament across the world. Considering the volume of transactions between public and private sectors and the financial interests at stake, there is now an international recognition that unmanaged conflicts of interest can impose a heavy cost on a country's economy. They can in particular distort competition and the allocation of public resources, waste public money and trigger scandals that weaken citizens' trust in public institutions.
A starting point for members and chapters interested on developing homegrown solutions to conflict of interest is a look at efforts by others countries in the same area. This Strategy Brief offers a look at a set of guidelines recently developed by the grouping of the world's leading industrial countries - the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD, through its Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service and its Principles of Corporate Governance , has developed the first comprehensive international benchmark to help member governments review and modernize conflict-of-interest policies for the public sector. Member governments are to report in 2006 on progress in implementing the Guidelines .
Lessons from the OECD Guidelines The OECD Guidelines on conflict resolution offer interesting lessons to Apnac members and chapters intent on pursuing similar projects in their parliaments. Among them are:
Clarity of Definition The first lesson of the OECD Guidelines is their definition of conflict of interest . They define conflict of interest as: “ a conflict between the public duties and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities .” This connotes a direct conflict or linkage between the member's public duties or responsibilities with his or her private business or professional interests. A public official having private interest is, in itself, therefore not the issue. Only where the particular private interests have a conflict with the official's responsibilities does conflict of interest occur.
The OECD Guidelines expounds the point by including in its list of the opportunities for conflicts of interest a number of specific situations. These are the situations:
• Where a public official has private business interests in the form of partnerships, shareholdings, board memberships, investments, government contracts, etc.
• Where a public official has affiliations with other organizations such as membership on the board of a non-profit organization that receives funding from the public agencies in which a public officials plays a role.
.• Where a public official leaving to work for a regulated private company or a chief executive taking up a key position in a government agency with a commercial relationship with his/her former company.
The key question is whether a public official is in a situation where his private interests might improperly influence the way he does his job.
The caveat – and a strong point in the OECD Guidelines – is that while it may be acceptable for a public official to have private interests so long as they are not in conflict with the public official's specific public duties, a situation that looks like a conflict of interest may be enough to undermine public confidence, even if in fact there is no conflict or it has already been resolved. An example is a senior public official who owns shares in a corporation that is competing for a contract to supply services to the official's agency. The agency may have formal internal arrangements to exclude the official from all decision making in such cases, but if they are not well-publicized the situation could still give rise to a scandal. Publicity is therefore a key component of tackling conflict of resolution perceptions.
Balance between Public and Private Interests A second lesson of the OECD Guidelines is an acknowledgement of an uncomfortable truth: that all conflicts of interest cannot be eliminated and that therefore public official' private interests need to be properly identified and managed in an appropriate manner. The OECD Guidelines thus recognize and work around the individual's right to have private interests by seeking to strike a balance between the public interest – protecting the integrity of public decisions – and the private interests of public officials. The aim is not to prevent public officials from having any private interests since an overly strict approach may infringe upon a public official's other rights, and could discourage competent potential candidates from seeking public office.
The lesson is that the immediate aim of a conflict-of-interest policy should be to protect the integrity of official policy and administrative decisions and of public management generally. The primary focus should be measures to help governments and public organizations review existing conflict-of-interest policy and practice for public officials working in national public administrations. Such a policy can also be designed to provide general guidance for other branches of government, sub-national government, and state-owned corporations.
Hierarchy of Measures to deal with Different Levels of Public Service A third lesson from the OECD Guidelines is the hierarchical treatment of conflict of interest according to the hierarchies of the public sector. The OECD Guidelines re commend that any conflict-of-interest policy should take into account the particular risk attached to certain categories of officials, especially policy makers and public office holders working in the most senior positions; public officials working in key functions of the state, such as law enforcement; and decision makers in sensitive areas such as at the interface of the public and private sector. Indeed, most OECD countries create particular conflict-of-interest policies for these specific categories. In principle, the higher the position, the stricter the policy and the more transparency required. For example, officials in these categories are regularly called upon to provide information on their financial assets, and in the case of the most senior public office holders this information is often made public.
Clear Principles A fourth lesson from the OECD Guidelines relates to the conciseness and brevity of the Guidelines' underlying principles. Only four core principles are set out for public officials to follow in dealing with conflict-of-interest situations. These are serving the public interest; supporting transparency; promoting individual responsibility; and creating an organizational culture that does not tolerate conflict of interest.
The Principle of Serving the Public Interest: This is explained as a requirement for public officials to make decisions and provide advice without regard for personal gain. Specifically, the decision maker's religious, professional, party-political, ethnic, family, or other personal preferences should not affect the integrity of official decision making. At the same time, public officials should dispose of, or restrict the operation of, private financial interests, personal relationships or affiliations that could compromise official decisions in which they are involved. Where this is not feasible – an official can hardly be expected to abandon her relationship with her husband or children in the interests of her job – a public official should abstain from involvement in official decisions that could be compromised by private interests.
Public officials should also avoid taking improper advantage in their private lives from “inside information” not available to the public that is obtained in the course of official duties. Public officials should therefore not engage in a private financial transaction which involves using confidential information obtained at work. In addition, public officials must not misuse their position and government resources for private gain, such as awarding a contract to a firm in the hope of obtaining a job with that firm on leaving public office.
The Principle of Supporting Transparency and Scrutiny: This principle requires public officials and public organisations to act in a way that will bear the closest public scrutiny. Specifically, public officials should disclose any private interests and affiliations that could compromise the disinterested performance of public duties when taking up office and afterwards if circumstances change, to enable adequate control and management of the situation.
Public organisations and officials should also ensure consistency and openness in resolving or managing conflict-of-interest situations, for example by providing up-to-date information about the organisation's policy, rules and administrative procedures regarding conflict of interest, or by encouraging discussion on how specific situations have been handled in the past and are expected to be handled in the future. Organisations should also promote scrutiny of their management of such situations, perhaps by involving employees in reviews of existing conflict-of-interest policy or consulting them on future preventive measures.
The principle of Promoting Individual Responsibility and Personal Example: This principle requires that public officials, particularly public office holders and senior managers, should act at all times in a manner that demonstrates integrity and thus serves as an example to other officials and the public. When dealing with individual cases, senior officials and managers should balance the interests of the organisation, the individual and the public. Public officials should also accept responsibility for arranging their private affairs so as to prevent conflicts of interest and for identifying and resolving conflicts in favour of the public when a conflict does arise. Where such need arises, an official could sell a relevant financial interest, or declare an interest in a particular issue and withdraw from the decision-making process.
The principle of Creating an Organisational Culture: This connotes the need for public organisations to create an organisational culture that does not tolerate conflict of interest. This can be done in a number of ways, such as raising awareness by publishing the conflict-of-interest policy, giving regular reminders, developing learning tools to help employees apply and integrate the policy and by providing concrete advice when need arises. Organisational practices should encourage public officials to disclose and discuss real, apparent or potential conflict-of-interest cases, and provide reasonable measures to protect them from retaliation. Public organisations should also create and sustain a culture of open communication and dialogue to promote integrity, while providing guidance and training to promote understanding.
- Compiled by Jonah Njonge. Drawn from the OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service, September 2005 Policy Brief of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD. The OECD Policy Briefs are available on the OECD's Internet site: www.oecd.org/publications/Policybriefs . OECD publications can be purchased from our online bookshop: www.oecdbookshop.org . OECD publications and statistical databases are also available via our online library: www.SourceOECD.org
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